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Hybrid Controls in Project Organizations
Abstract
For the past decade, project organization has become increasingly central to management and
organization studies, particularly as these seek to discern the contours of post-modern organizations.
Yet, these contours frequently seem to be sighted without bearings on the current realities of project
management. In this paper we take such bearings, using data derived from a detailed qualitative,
ethnographic enquiry into the experience of project management. Project managers from France
speak authentically about the experience of being a project manager. From this data we construct the
contours more sharply. Rather than being a harbinger of an autonomous and more democratic future,
free from extant bureaucratic organization controls, we find that project management has distinct
modalities of control that we outline in the paper: behavioural, calculative, organizational, professional
and corporate. Indeed, rather than foreshadowing a future transformational form, we find traces of a
much older design: that of Tocqueville.
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Resume
Depuis 10 ans, I'organisation par projet est devenue peu a peu centrale dans les recherches sur Ie
management et les organisations, en particulier celles cherchant a discerner les contours de
I'organisation dite post-mademe. Toutefois ces contours sont souvent depeints lndependamment des
rea lites communes du management de projet. Dans ce papier nous cherchons a prendre en compte
certaines de ces realites en utilisant des donnees issues d'une enquete ethnographique qualitative
detaillee au CCBurde l'experience du management de projet. Des managers de projet francais y
parlent de faCion intime de leur experience. A partir de ces donnees nous tentons de construire les
caracterlstlques de I'organisation post modeme de facon plus nette. Plutot que de preflqurer un futur
plus dernocratique et autonome, Iibere des controles de I'organisation bureaucratique. nous
proposons que Ie management de projet comporte des modalltes diverses de connote, creant des
hybridations specitlques. II s'agit alors moins d'anticiper une forme organisationnelle nouvelle que de
decrypter dans les hybrides actuellement en construction les traces de formes plus anciennes et
toujours pertinentes de gouvernance et de regimes politiques. Le travail pionnier de Tocqueville nous
permet d'entrer dans ce debat.
Mots cles : projet, organisation, contrele, pouvolr, bureaucratie, regime politique
Introduction: A World of Projects
Project management, in the lay sense, is an inescapable aspect of being human (Schatz, 1967). Our
humanity is collectively represented in histories and stories of various projects: schooling, university,
lovers, partners, children, families, work, life and death - the human condition. Each of us is an
individual self-steering projectile operating in a field of force too complex to grasp most of the time, our
trajectories assigned by randomness as much as by class, gender, status, and those resources that
we can control. While we all have life-projects and seek to manage these, only some of us are explicit
project managers.
To be a project manager is a relatively specialised activity: it is to assume a responsibility for the
management and accomplishment - the completion - of various projects characterised by their
finitude, their scope, and their contractual particulars. Usually, but not always, these are commercial
projects - they are projects where, above all else, a one is expected to make a profit - as well as a
bridge, a building, a tunnel or a discovery. There are myriads of such projects and every project tells a
story, often many stories. Sometimes these are stories of desires attained, sometimes of regrets that
must be lived with, sometimes of dreams accomplished or nightmares produced. There are
innumerable and remarkable stories of people who have revelled in glory, and a feeling of
accomplishment, or have been deceived or punished. But this is not how, in recent times, organization
theorists have seen these project managers; instead, they have regarded them as circuit breakers for
bureaucracy, a short cut from the modem to the postmodem, from bureaucracy and hierarchy to post-
bureaucratic professionalism and collaboration (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994).
Early commentators on 'new-form organizations' or 'postmodern organizations', such as Hydebrand
(1989) or Clegg (1990) had presumed a connection between the past of modernity and bureaucracy
and the future of a project-based postmodern organizational world. At base, their conceptions of post-
bureaucracy seemed to combine elements of an organic structure (Bums and Stalker, 1962) with
changed modalities of control shifted to more indirect and internalised forms, as writers such as
Heydebrand (1989: 345) and Sewell (1998: 408) suggest. Elements of empowerment and self-reliance
formed the basis for an elective affinity between project management practice and ideas of post-
bureaucracy centred on unobtrusive peer-based teamwork controls (Sewell, 1998; Barker, 1999; also
see Black and Edwards, 2000; Fairtlough, 1994; Miles and Snow 1996).
It is easy to see why project management may appear to be a beacon for jaded organization theory. It
is clearly an activity not wholly contained within bureaucratic corporate hierarchies: it occurs in field
and laboratory settings; outside the formal structuring of organizations, and often involves the
coordination of complex networks and inter-organizational relations. Yet, despite its appeal to
postmodems, project management includes a strong hierarchical dimension, vertically defining
objectives and responsibilities, which serve as an instrumental legitimation of project action.
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At Its strongest there have been claims that a 'projectlfied' society of organizations (Lundin and
Sl:lderholm, 1998), run on project management principles, Is emerging. However, we wish to suggest
In this paper that there Is little evidence that mainstream project-management can serve as a talisman
for future organizational design aspirations. Project management, as it Is currently practiced In typical
cases, does not mean the abolition of the much-criticised abstraction of hierarchical organization, but
Its recomposltlon and reconfirmation. Rather than projec1 management being based on respect for
alternative abstractions, such as equality or justice, or even participation, It practices purposive
decision-making that combines authority with objectives and control with efficiency. Thus, as we shall
argue, the everyday life through which project managers enact organization remains deeply
embedded In the mundane particulars of a world of hierarchy. New organizational forms -to be new-
cannot be an organizational variant on the same bureaucratic theme as before. If poslrnodern
organizations are to arise like a phoenix from the ashes of present project management they will do so
not out of necessity but conviction. And there will have to be a large bonfire. As we shall suggest, It
would have to Justify consuming at least the Insights of Tocquevllle, as well as the more readily
Infiammable Insights of this paper.
The professional work of project management draws heavily on the PMI (Project Management
Institute), created In the United States at the end of the 1960s. Professionals, particularly In the
management of major projects, gather to formulate a management model linked to the logics of
organization for each projec1. However, It was not until the start of the 1980s that a real panel of
specialists was created: with an ethical code, clearly Identified knowledge, and certiflcatlon. The aim
was to unify project management practices via a unique and standardising paradigm. And this
standardisation led to the definition of criteria that allowed for the Identification and classification of
project types. Projects were to be listed according to the size of the team, the International dimension
in the organization, the regUlatory and professional tradition of the sector of activity, for example.
Project management Is practised In many diverse organizations: from small businesses that arrange
local wedding, meetings, and conventions to major multi-national corporations that project strategies
far Into the future. From the point of view of a professional project, such diversity means standardising
the expertise required of those In charge of the model. Consequently, project management has been
subject to the classical strategy of professlonallzation as social closure, according to Weber's (1978)
model.
Organization Theory and Project Management Not surprisingly, In a heterogenous professional field, It Is the prestigious professions that make the
running in this professional project. For Instance, in France, the AFITEP: Association Franga/se des
fngeniaurs at Technicians d'cstlmatlon de Pfaniflcatlon at da Projat developed a synthesis of the
methods and procedures of project management practices. It transmitted these via project
methodology and management-training programs, complete with certification (see Midlar 1993 on
AFNOR' NF X 50-107). Such standardisation is Increasingly reflected In the segmentation of project
types, allOWing one to build activity/actor matrixes, according, for example, to project size. Further,
within the body of knOWledge of project management, there Is a "who does what" reasoning that
rationalises roles, enabling an official division of responsibilities at different stages of the project.
If one asked project managers to think of themselves and their work In the terms of organization and
social theories such as we embrace - that is to say, in terms of power - they might well look amiss. As
simple scientists or engineers, they know little of these conceptions and their concerns. Their world Is
one of rationality: their task Is to unfold the reason embedded in the design, the plan, and the contract,
to achieve the goal. To do this they draw on a project management body of knowledge and project
management models. The latter are software tools that are widely used with the aim of delivering
projects on bUdget, on time, on quality. They provide standardised generic practices for project
management premised on Idealised representations of project methods and formalised organizational
practices (Raisanen and LInde, 2001). In turn, they emerge out of a project management genealogy
that traditionally embodies a "well-established pattern of discourse that has served to privilege the
more commercial and pragmatic alms of Improved project coordination and control at the expense 'of
traditional powers and autonomy" (Bresnen, 1996: 264). In turn, Its core texts, such as Cleland and
King (1968) and Lock (1968), build on ideas that derive from classical theories of management, such
as Fayol (1949).
As organization theorists, how should we confront this certitude, this rationality? Armed with our Ideas
of bounded rationality we might caution project managers that rationality would always be situational,
always infused with power. As Foucaull (1977: 27-28) says "power produces knowledge ... power
and knowledge directly Imply one another . . . there Is no power relation without the creative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the
same time power relations." In such a vlaw rationalities and powers are fused. Different power actors
will operate in and through different rationalities. The different rationalities will have their different rules
for producing sense. In fact, sense cannot be separated from the ensemble of rules that constitute it _
and It's obverse - as such. Rules are always constituted locally by actors, rather than being the
objective Instantiation of a general principle or law. Whatever regularities occur empirically will always
be situational. Such Ideas were first charted in Clegg's (1975) empirical account of project
management In action, draWing on data derived from records of project management site meetings.
At the core of project management Is the central concept of the project life cycle. The concept stands
as an Idealised representation of any and all projects as being comprised of five phases: conception,
feasibility, implementation, operation and termination. The emphasis is on technocratic planning that
seeks to be a comprehensive system, employing techniques such as PERT (Program Evaluation and
Review Techniques) and CPM (Critical Path Methods), and software tools such as Microsoft Project,
which can be used to monitor project progress. Rational tools are aligned with rational procedures of
project reporting.
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, AFNOR I. the French AssoclaUon for Nonnallzatlon. producing and establishing nann. of quality for products and processes.
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Remote Control or Post-Bureaucratic ProJectified Futures?
Studying projects In process Is one approach to capturing their dynamic but, as a project comes Into
being as elapsed time, this process becomes history - however contested It may sometimes be. Most
of the disputes that occur around projects concern the nature of such elapsement, how It Is
materialised In relation to some Imaginedproject aim. Sometimes these aims are quite tangible, In the
form of detailed CAD/C/iM projections.Other times they are an aspiration, such as the desire to put a
dog In space or a man on the moon. What relates the most tangible and the most Intangible project
aspirations Is the simple fact that none ever comes Into being without Imagination of some projected
outcome. No imagination Is ever materialised without a minute and detailed organizational apparatus
of disciplinary power: techniques of draWing,CAD, representation, reading of technical texts, and their
translation Into prototypes and actions. Driving the detailed capillary networks of disciplinary power,
the project manager turns Imagined entities Into material realities, making real the history of a project
first projected In the abstract. Abstraction becomes reality when project managers assemble powers
to make it happen. Project management Is thus botha political and a governance project. As a political
project It makes a difference - It accomplishes things that would not otherwise exist. In terms of
governance It constructs a complex but temporary apparatus of Instrumental support for the
professional work that will make that difference.
We can now introduce our central question: given what we know of project work as It Is presently
practised by members of the project management profession, to what extent does It provide a sound
empirical basis for the anticipationof a post-bureaucratic projectlfied future?
Contemporary managerial discourse and practices for the past decade have been characterized
mainly by the emergence of political and organizational models that, whatever else they might be,
have been opposed to "bureaucracy" as their "other". That Is to say, they have sought to deflne
themselves against bureaucracy: they have been termed, variously, post-bureaucratic (Heckscher and
Donnellon 1994), postmodern (Clegg, 1990), post-modern (Alvesson 1992) or, because they "take
entrepreneurship a stage further" (Kanter 1990: 280), even post entrepreneurial (Kanter 1990). The
models define themselves through "check lists" of criteria (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) as well as
through the Ideological apparatus they convey (Du Gay 2000).
Project management, while organizationally enacted, Is professional work: because of Increased
disciplinary training In project management methods by professional associations, Its organizational
division of labour are Increasingly based on a small number of sophisticated technologies and
software. These aid standardisation. There Is a move from past methods of organization linked to
criteria such as tradition and craft to disciplinary skills, speclallsatlons and standards. Such a strategy
for the creation of a "project managemenr profession offers commercially Independent accredited
sources of legitimacy and power to Its practitioners. The standing of being a member of a profession
comes from outside of the employing organizations, via the professional associations. To the extent
that professionalism becomes organizationally legitimate for employers then the project profession
appears to gain status. It offers an alternative source of career status to that of progression through
the hierarchical ranks of bureaucratic management while clearly co-existing with these. The
opportunity to build a professional career as a series of projects clearly requires organizational
contexts In which to operate and perform. These organizational contexts will obviously produce
different contexts in which to produce a career from those Weberlan bureaucracies at the core of
'modern' organization theory (Clegg, 1990). It Is, perhaps, for these reasons that some Influential
reports (http://www.dol.gov/asp/fulureworklexecsum.pd!l regard the future of work as Increasingly
likely to be constructed on a project basis, as contingent and staffed by just In time workers.
Slightly lagged with the emergence of this dualism ant-bureaucratization In these modelling
endeavours has been another tendency. Organizations should no longer be illuminated by a unique
view of power, governance and managerial roles. It matters not whether these are bureaucratic or
anti-bureaucratic In their principle of articulation. The fleld of organization studies has been depicted
as relying Increasingly on paradoxes (Lewis 2000). The call has been made to go "beyond dualisms"
(Reed 1997) Into the analysis of "hybrids" such as network forms (Bianchi and Bellini, 1991; Burt,
1992; Castells, 1996; Chaston, 199; 1996; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Ebers, 1997; HlIusler, Hohn
and LOlz, 1994; Kogut, Shan andWalker, 1992; Nohrla and Eccles, 1992; Powell, 1987; 1998; Powell,
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Hybrldlty has become fashionable: for Instance, Ackoff (1994) depicts
new "hybrid political regimes", composed of "democratic hierarchy". In relatively uncertain frameworks
of power (Clegg 1989) hybrid forms combine opposite cultures and roles In a more or less stable
structure (Courpasson 2000), organizing "circular" forms of decision-making (Romme 1999).
Entrepreneurlal-hybrld-network-soft-control (Munro 1999) appears to be the result of complex
Interlinkages between Impersonal and subjective instrumentations, for which project management Is a
typical example. As political machinery It contains, at the same time and In the same place, the soft
and the hard side of management. Let us now consider some of the organizational reasons why
project management - which Is certainly not a new discovery - might be seen In this light.
Project management tends to be done In places often physically separate or remote from corporate
organizations under Instructions that these organizations produce elsewhere. However, being remote
does not necessarily entail autonomy: It can mean remote control. The systematic use of procedures
and formalisation by corporate bodies Is an acknowledgment of a degree of autonomy of those
Involved In projects and an attempt at their remote control. The conditions under which project
management Is practised are symptomatic of the political centralisation that corporate organizations
seek to exercise, even over many project sites at a distance. In fact, such organizations are specialist
In exercising power at a distance, through Intermediariesand by remote control.
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Remotecontrol of any agency Is problematic, especially when projects are designed to be Innovative.
Innovation requires agents to exercise discretion rather than perform authorised actions. Innovation
may be experienced In any aspect of organizational projects: relations, processes, products, or forms
of production. One particular form of Innovation, common In large-scale project work, entails project
managers working In collaborations managed by multiple organizational partners. Under such
circumstances innovation policies will be structured around specific collaboration agreements.
SomeUmesthe use of Increased formalisation, defined as "quasi-Judicial" In the project process, will be
considered as a substitute for hierarchy In such processes. Such procedures allow for rational
argument, favouring dialogue between the corporate hierarchies and members of the project team, as
well as the Intemal resolution of potentlalllligatlon.
far as It may seem from the bureaucratic Ideal. It Is based on the power of project management to
produce Instrumental action seemingly Independent of context. Project management of innovation
authorises specific actions In a relatively foreseeable universe from which value-considerations,
typically, are excluded. (One thinks of the Manhattan Project, various experiments In blo-genetlcs, and
cloning technology, for Instance.) Competitively, as a part of a corporate portfolio of projects, any
specific project will be assigned hurdles and milestones that must be met or exceeded If the project
manager is to retain organizational confidence.
Formalised procedures often have to handle rarely predictable project outcomes. Consequently,
organl~atlons must design systems to transform "unknown situations into plans of uncertainty"
(MichaUd and Thoenlg, 2000, 9). While uncertain situations can be managed, unknown situations
usually can only be dealt with through Intuition (Michaud and Thoenlg, 2000), which, by definition, may
not be available when needed. Organizations standardise behaviour to allow for the creation and
sharing of "substantial and procedure-based" know-how (Michaud and Thoenlg, 2000,10), usually
through "soft bureaucracy" (Courpasson 2000).
The second disparate element Is a system similar to that which Michaud and Thoenlg (2000, 138)
define as "common knowledge", Involving "common reasoning which concems both the 'effects' to
generate and the means to produce them". For project processes to ba successful, the various
protagonists must check that they share the same conception of the project, Its success and the
criteria required for its success. Often these will Involve new forms of govern mentality designed to
achieve coherence based on project cultures framed In highly normative and performance-related
terms to create collective economically self-interested actors (Clegg et ai, forthcoming). Although such
project management systems are not necessarily united In what Giddens (1984) calls "co-presence
contexts" they involve a sharing of common opinions and even values, which, unlike systems based
wholly on codification, allow managers a degree of freedom to face innovation challenges. However,
degrees of freedom also imply degrees of tension, centred on the legitimacy of project action.
Soft bureaucracies are characterised by "the expansion of liberal management based on
decentralisation and the 'marketlsatlon' of organizations and autonomy . . . hand In hand with the
development of a highly centralised and authoritarian form of govemment" (Courpasson 2000: 159).
The dSCentred and market elements are oriented towards Innovative action that Is, organizationally, a
far cry from bureaucratic systems defined by centralisation and the omnipotence of Impersonal
procedures. A soft and hybrid s9stem of project-based democracy Is Increasingly seen as the most
efficient means for managing semi-autonomous projects, subsidiaries and services In larger
organl~atlons. Soft systems rationalise the move of cert~in prerogatives away from central services to
operational units While legitim Ising those functions kept within the discretionary part of central activity:
the selection of project directors and bosses, the management of "key" projects, the granting of funds
(for R&D In particular.
Hybrid Legitimacies
The legllimacy of project leaders exhibits a fundamental tension. A project leader, like a "normal"
hierarchical head, has a reserve of legitimacy, once nominated by his superiors. Ultimately, the
fundamental reasons for nomination (specific skills, being an "Inventor/lnnovator" behind the Idea, or
just the sheer randomness of opportunity) are less Important than the fact that the team members
consider the project leader as part of the central governing system of the organization. Thus, one part
of their legitimacy Is based on status-hierarchy.
The reSulting organizational form enables the combination of disparate elements of two systems: first,
a system of regUlation by codification and rigid procedures, which is likely to lead 10 consistent
behaViOur. The bureaucratic element In such codification Is designed and Implemented by exogenous
actors: R&D directors, company head offices, and project management specialists. Thus, being
Involved in a project means respect for the official rules and procedures, where one knows,
approximately, how the other protagonists will react In whatever unforeseen circumstances. This Is
clearly not so far from the notion of confidence but closer to a notion of the production of relatively
stable, acceptable, cognitive structures, strengthened by an accumulation of Individual and collective
experience In project management. Combining a procedural system and a cognitive system Is not as
Project managers are not only leaders, however, but are also responsible for the success of a
potentially Important mission, given the resources put as their disposal. From then on, the project
leader, assessed on a capacity to lead a team towards this success, has a certain power over the
other team members. The success and commitment of one depends on the success of another, and
visa versa. In the project, nobody has the right to fall and this pressure to succeed shapes the
legitimacy of the project leader, qualifying the status-hierarchy Into a "quasi-hierarchical" role where
the personal- rather than the task - status Is enhanced.
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These two key resources however (organizational nomination, leading to status-hierarchy, and
pressure to succeed, leading to personal status) are also counterbalanced by certain sources of de-
legitimation. The first can be found In the extreme power that project management affords classical
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hierarchies to grant or refuse the resources required for the project. It creates a form of official
dependence, since the project requires resources It Is not capable of supplying Itself. The second
source lies In the fact that the project leader Is stili In most cases part of tha hierarchy: the position of
project leader can come up against stable and solid hierarchical structures able to dismiss those who
mange to be recalcitrant.
rules and procedures and a capacity to create the future. That this Is tha case can best be seen In the
"Intimate histories" (Zeldin 1995) of project management that we have been collecting for many years.
From such short stories we build our theory.
Building theory from short stories
The tension betweenthe personal and the hierarchical means that project authority Is based more on
Interdependence than on hierarchical status. Consequently, the position of project leader will always
veer towards being personalized: one obeys such and such a project leader In such and such a way
because of theway that such a project leader manages to communicate, coordinate and control the
pressure to SUcceed.Yet, simultaneously with this personalization, a project leader's authority also
has elements of the Impersonal because It results from an organizational nomination. Yet, to the
extent that the project takes place at some remove from the centres of power, out In the capillaries of
Its micro-systems, then Its personal embodiment will tend to over-determine its legitimate positioning
within the overallformal networks of power.
Ideally, since at least Socrates, It Is generally agreed that theory should be explicit, universal and
abstract. That Is to say, it must be such that no reasonable person working from Its given
presuppositions could fall to reach the conclusions that It recommends, through steps In
argumentation that all can follow and are applicable everywhere, and that stand apart from concrete
exemplars of the theory. As Flyvbjerg (2000: 38-9) notes, Descartes and Kant supplement these three
criteria with two more: theory must be discrete and It must be systematic. That Is to say, It must not
depend on a context outside of Its own protocols and It must be complete, with a set of systematic
relations between Its elements. Finally, theory should be complete and predictive: that Is to say,
potential ranges of variation In Its elements must be speclfled and their effects prefigured, making
possible precise predictions.
The perceived prOXimityof the project with the centre of the organization, the more or less Innovative
or strategic character of the project and the degree of control It Is under, even the person behind the
Idea behind the project _ all these will have an Impact on the Intensity and nature of the authority of
the project leader. Team members know that, at least for a while, they may be dependent on the
project leader for their personal evaluations.
These six criteria define an Ideal type of science but they do not define what social scientists actually
do when they do science. The reason Is paradoxical but simple:
[Tlheory that makes possible explanaUon and predlcUon ... requires that the concrete
context of everyday human activtly be eXcluded, but this very exclusion of context
makes explanaUon and predlcUon Impossible (Flyvbjerg, 2000: 40).
Projects typicallyoccur In locations that are either physically or metaphorically remote from corporate
bureaucracies, whether In field settings such as exploration or construction, Innovative "skunk-works",
or R&D projects. Such remoteness poses particular organizational tensions for corporate hosts of
these projects. The challenge Is to reconcile the system of project authority with those structures of
power embedded In the corporate body. The exercise of hierarchical power Is far from being
structurally linked to clear project systems of legitimised authority. Hierarchical power depends on
bureaucratic legitimacy embedded in routines and rules while project authority requires creativity and
innovation In the accomplishment of objectives, rather than adherence to strict rules. Besides, as
experienced project managers know, such strict rules are merely resources for creativity and
Innovation In their Interpretation and negotiation (Clegg, 1975). Hence, external regulation meets
project govemmentality In a highly personalized bureaucracy.
The reasons are evident: context-dependence Implies an open-ended contingent relationship between
contexts, actions situated within them, and any Interpretation that may be made of them. It Is through
stories that we give context to experience. Stories tell us who we are and where we belong as well as
where we are going. In short, they Illuminate Imagination and Imaginatively construct histories.
Framed In between the desiderata of externally Imposed regulation and Inter-subjectively shared
governmentallly, project management creates and Imposes codes while at the same time as it
organizes and makes formal a number of negotiable exceptional possibilities (concerning deadlines,
for example). It Is based on a number of written supports, whose aim Is formally to state the required
actions, yet II must always leave room for Innovation and creativity, disciplined by governmental
norms. Thus, project management can be considered a hybrid between the centralised enactment of
As researchers, we have collected storytelling data on project careers - who wins and loses, using
what strategies and ralionalilies - In real contexts and situations. Such stories often start from little
things, from things close at hand to the Individuals, focusing on detailed descriptions and accounts of
everyday experience. What we search for are accounts of practical, bounded, situational rationality. In
the small pearls of everyday experience we see dialogical themes for social science to engage with.
Thus, It matters not that the sample of stories that we retell and retail are small- the human comedy Is
an Infinity of stories - but how their themes illuminate significant tensions, themes, and paradoxes of
this condition of human agency within structural conditions.
To interpret stories of project management politically requires one to Interpret the experience of those
behind it, the teams and their activities. In other words, over and above Interpreting Individual
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biographies as personal work-stories, one should attempt to undarstand these in their political context,
a context in which personal troubles assume a more pUblic dimension. We draw out themes from a
total of fifteen stories (see table 1) that we have collected In this project and feature two In particular.
Well, we can imagine the reader scoffing but for our enterprise, no additional power would be gained
by making it one or two hundred stories. Of course, If we were to Increase the scale then we would
have to decrease the words and convert stories Into another kind of data - probably numbers.
Numbers have their representational uses, and we will not deny this, but they are not required to
replace the sometimes long, often Intriguing, Interviews that have peppered our research Into the
political aspect of projects. In our interviews we have Investigated the reasons why a manager leads
or entered Into a project. We wanted to explore what they understand the firm expects In nominating
them for such responsibility. The aim of the stories which follow is not to present personal
melodramas, nor to present the backroom heroes, but to show that the project is In fact often the end
of a saga, and the start of a fairly rapid and steady move towards calculable and easily controllable
objectives.
Manager Age' Type of project nmeJ Post project Disciplinary
background
H. 50 R&D and manufacturing 3yaa", Back to production managament Chamlcal anglneer
processes In a delocallsad factory
M. 38 R&D In blotechnologlas 5yaa", raken aI/the project Doctoreta In
Molecular biology
J.C. 30 Construcllon of a factory In 2yaa", Takan 011 the project and then Civil englnaer
eastem europe nomlnatad as laadar of another
projactln manUfacturing
processea
M.C. 34 Implamenllng NnC In HRM 2,5 yea", Head of HR department In Business school
departments enotOOr company and Ms In NnC In
england
L. 47 Developing new 2yaa", Nomlnatad buslnass un/l engineer + MBA
buslnesslproducts In a banking managar
lirm
D 37 R&D In microprocessors 1,5yaa", Taken 01/ the project. Raplaced Computer engineer
by a product menager In
mamellng. Back to R&D lab.
J.L. 34 Reanglneering of a producllon 1 yaar Aller e confllel wIIh the fectory Docloreta In
system In cer Industry manager, recruited to another Mechanics
IIrm
S. 30 R&D In pharmaceullcallndustry 2 years Aller a technical success, Doctorete In
nominated head of "advanced Pharmacy
technologies" office In the R&D Doctorete In
deparlment Microbiology
E. 30 Implemenllng new procedures 2 years Conll/cts with some Business School
and new rewanJ systems based decentrellzed HR Managers. Masters In HRM
on lIexlbie retributions Recruited afler 6 months to a
consul/lngllrm
M.P. 38 Leading a corporete project In 3 Not yatlinlshed MA
order to create a "knowledge MP Is to change job shortly MBA
centre"
J.F. 38 R&D In nuclear anargy: new 3 Head of a new project Implying 3 Electrical engineer
processes In security systems nuclear plents In eestem europa
v. 48 Project Director In auto Industry: e 3 Nomlneted Heed of Purchasing Engineer
new desIgn for converlibles Depertment
Table 1. Summary of 15 cases of project managers (data colleeted 1999)
Our analysis Is thematic (Boje, 2001), moving between etlc and emic levels of enalysis,ln a search for
patterns (Spradley, 1980). We have selected the biographies of project managers as the domain for
analysis and sought to create an Inventory of contrasts between projects experienced In the past
compared with present day condillons. From this Inventory we Idenllfied key themes around the
concept of control. Our Interest In control was theoreticelly derived from the confluence of our interests
In bureaucracy and domination (Courpasson, 2000; Clegg, 1981; 1975; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980)
and so was not enllrely Inductive. To be sure, we did look, deducllvely, for the themes that have
preoccupied our professional work In the tales of these project managers, but as the data appendices
demonstrate, the themes were also Inducllvely there. To try and provide some flavour of the stories we
draw on two In particular - those of Henri and Michel, providing two very different subjecllve views In
response to a simple question: "Why did you become a project manager?4.
, Al the beginning otthe project
, Extent of the project leadership
• The lulllranscript 01 the Interview. Is available Irom the authors.
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Henri Is a new processes project manager for a large company In the food-processing Industry. His
tale recounts the gradual apprenticeship of a manager who little by little, began to understand project
management In terms of control, a system In which all autonomy Is rigidly supervised by the Imposed
Instructions. Henri was 52 in August 1998 when we met him over a period of two weeks to hear him
talk about his career as a project manager. Henri was Initially attracted to project managing because
he saw himself as a man of action, as someone who could get things done, who could leave his
personal material stamp on the world. Henri Is a doer rather more than a thinker, a successful man
boxed In by the circumstances of his own history. He related an old-style approach to project
management as well as providing us with a vision of the changes that occurred since the beginning of
his career. Our second story concems Michel, a research scientist. He describes his job as one "noted
for its slow progress". His experience with project management illuminated the bureaucratic element of
this management tool and the constraints and limits It can Impose on those most resistant to control.
When we spent half a day with Michelin September 1998 to discuss his position as research scientist
and project leader In the field of plant resistance to herbicides, he was In his early-thirties. Michel did a
Doctoral thesis In molecular biology and was then hired by his present firm. His career has been
simple and fairly straightforward, but the role of project leader he feels Is Increasingly Incompatible
with that of a researcher, which led him to wonder about his future.
Intermediaries to set them off. They need mixed teams, finances, plans, and bureaucracies In the
background that deliver the goods -litarally. Being an Intermediary historically has Involved
a series of minute Interactions In the presence of others. It means that force Is no longer
In total command. It means that the humble or the timid can contribute to great
adventures without being too concemed who Is superior to whom: a minute Ingredient
can have as much effect as a large one. Intennedlaries Injecl an element of the
unexpecled Inlo human affairs. which can have negative as well as stimulating resulls;
and they are always tempted 10 demand 100 high a price for their efforts. But they
nourish when they please all parties equally, when they oppress nobody (Zeldin, 1995:
161).
Project managers as Intermediaries perform dual roles In organizations: they bring categories together
but they also keep them apart, as Bloomfield and Vurdubakls (1997) suggest. Being a project
manager Is as much to do with people and the political relations Involved In managing them and with
financial - rather than engineering - techniques. As political Intermediaries project managers seek to
mobilise different people, systems and things In pursuit of common goals.
Autonomy, Intermediation and Power
Henri manages power In two distinct and positive ways. For him, power Is not a negation of the power
of others but a positive force that enables others to achieve the histories that other's Imaginations
have scripted and power will materialise. First, he manages political relationships with those site
workers whom he supervises. Little Is said of these directly, but we can assume that a measure of his
success In this regard Is that nothing needs to be said: the relations are not macho, antagonistic and
zero-sum. Anyway, there Is no need for them to be - they are managed by formal documents that
circulate everywhere they are required. "Only formal documents are sent, but that Is their strength, the
respect of the rules and regulations which In turn allows all those Involved In the project to meet In
committees and to know the position of things." When procedural rationality frames the truth of
projects then people listen to Its terms and debate fiows within Its parameters of normalcy - Its modes
of rationality. It Is In this way that Henri self-manages the power that manages him. This Is the power
of numbers, of rationality, of finances, "to be supervised when working on high-stake financial projects,
where mistakes are out of the question." As he goes on to say, "Autonomy exists If you can fulfil your
duties; you lose It if you make a false move."
Henri's last job was characterised by reduced autonomy. The company directors budgetary and
managerial concerns developed to such an extent that, under the threat of their own risk-taking, they
could no longer trust their delegated project managers. This contrasted sharply with his earlier career.
Henri was employed at the beginning In peripheral and relatively autonomous sites, In comparison
with more Impersonal centralised ones, and he was able to select and to lead his project teams more
or less as he pleased. He was learning to become a project leader. For around 30 years, Henri
experienced an Increase In the bureaucratisation of complex Industrial project management and the
centrallsallon of decision-making units for all aspects of the projects he was supposedly responsible
for: technical, managerial, and human. In learning to be a project manager Henri learnt also to become
an intermediary: "A lot depended on feeling and how we got on with the others", he said of those early
days when he first learned the project managers task. Later, when he gained the job that he had when
we met him, II was these Intermediary skills that were vital. "Overall, having accepted this job has
proven that most of what I learnt technically during my previous jobs was not the most Important In the
eyes of the directors. What I mean Is that by nomlnallng me project director they hoped to benefit from
my 15 years of management and control experience. That was what they wanted, that I was used to
working with mixed teams, power struggles, In other words, Intermediate and uncomfortable positions."
As he says later In his conversallon, he had learnt to control and to be controlled, to be an
Intermediary. There Is an honourable and historically complex history to this role, as Zeldin (1995:
154-164) explains. Intermediaries, such as project managers, are like catalysts - they need other
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Henri's career path has not been easy: he sought willingly to learn more about the role of Industrial
project manager, only to be excluded for two main reasons. First, because of his age, second,
because of the gap between hands-on management and the formal management systems he had to
obey for eight years. The price paid was to sacrlfice any attempts at Innovallon that arose during this
time. This Is Important since II suggests, as a hypothesis, that the Increasing systemisation and cost-
control of project management led Henri to abandon Innovation. In other words, the company directors
prefer project leaders who concentrate on the rules and their objectives at the outset of any project.
Leaders are not encouraged to propose better but more cosily solullons to the strategy committee
than those that are already In place. This Is a sure sign of bureaucratisation, of strengthening rules
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and existing methods to prevent any personal Initiative that might risk destabllisatlon of the plan. The
rule In the company Is clear: continue working on what has proven to be successful for new production
sites In the past and avoid wasting time studying expensive new possibilities whose outcome Is
uncertain. Bureaucracy comes Into play whenever management constraints mean choosing
reassuring paths and excluding what could be considered more adventurous paths, where the results
are uncertain.
hierarchy. He has become a managerial delegate, deigned to Intermediate between the world of
commerce and the world of nature. He doesn't really think of himself as a project 'leader'. As a
scientist he experienced project management as a dispossession of disciplinary control. More
precisely, our sclenllst accepts being severely and regularly supervised by a number of commltlees,
he believes not only that he has no choice but also that this control may enable his disciplinary
knowledge to succeed In the organization. Michel's experience would suggest that project
management can be experienced as a process in which one has to give up something - respect
based on disciplinary knOWledge - and also remain pragmetlc. What Is given up Is a scientific dream
considered too costly and uncertain in favour of being pragmatic. ''That's over now - the best way is
the shortest way". The project managers as a specific group of experts largely elaborate these hybrid
forms of governance of project management, between the scienlific-entrepreneurlal adventure and the
managerial pragmalism/cynism. They act to some extent as "servants of domination", In terms similar
to those foreshadowed by de Tocqueville (1961,1996: 418), for civil servants, through their ways of
finding solutions to the professional/career dilemmas that confront them.
In such cases project management Is the fusion of bureaucracy with Indeterminacy. Companies use
bureaucracy to codify and provide procedures, to accompany Individual and group action. Such action
Is necessary for the project to make ground as well as to assess the level of success of the solutions
Implemented at the end of the project, and decide whether or not to use them again for future projects.
In this light, the project becomes a tool for standardisation but Its achievement Is always conllngent on
"imaglnallon" and "new techniques" - which must not fall. Thus, "the trend today Is to find the perfectly
organised and structured person."
For Michel, things are quite similar even If interpreted in a quite different way. His story Is based on the
search for a compromise between strong ethical values as a scientist and the necessary pragmallsm
of a manager. Michel's career shows how difficult It Is to resist the powerful constraints of project
management. This second story Is like a clamp slowly suffocating an ambition Ultimately judged
Incompatible with the concerns of the decision-makers whose job Is to supervise Michel's project.
Henri and Michel are typical of the many project managers we have encountered. Their
professionalism Is based less on the autonomy of leading project research so much as the will of
corporate bodies. Tha mechanism Is simple and relatively classical. It distils, essentially, to two
principles. The first is the construction and acknowledgment of a model of required skills for successful
project management. This model Is mainly basad on the ability to raad, Interpret and finally apply rules
and procedures related to the project management system. Such elemants are based on the cholca of
persons who have a rigorous managerial profile and also a "regulatory" profile, In other words, who
respect the "rules". Those responsible for leading and governing Innovation processes must base their
actions on ethics that respect the quality and efficacy of procedures. A rula-gulded context becomes a
resource In decision-making procasses and a protective systam In case of contestation.
When a scientist considers project management a necessary step towards promotion a highly specific
aspect of Its political power Is revealed. But, with such a promotion something happens to self-respect:
scientifically, one looses It with no gain as a scientist-manager, except as a manager of milestones,
deadlines, targets, and suchlike. As an emissary In a complex web, Michel has lost respect for himself
as a sclenllst but found no power as a manager. It was not expected to be that way: "at the beginning I
thought It was all very positive, that I would benefit from all the advantagas of being a scientist without
the negative points of being a leader". Consequently, In Michal's story we see project management
becoming a managerial Inslllution - a system which Is both usaful and efficient and which seeks to
generate its own legitimacy. Project management legitimacy can be conslderad a tool of
governmentality In Michel's case; the project Is vital if he wants to move up and It Is this fact that forces
him to accept the conditions imposed by his superiors. It Is not Important in Itself but In the political
relationship It creates between Individuals and an organization. It generates a situation where
Individuals are supervised, penalised or rewarded, selected, etc. It creates efficient and effective
relays of power while It steals scientific self-respect: "they put us under pressure to go faster and
faster. In the biotech field, the stakes are enormous, and the biggest change to date Is that every day
you hear 'where are you at now?""
The second principle guiding the production of professional project management Is that of situational
and concentrated testing practices. The systems for the detection and steering of future project
directors are based on tests, over relatively short periods, for easy assessment of individual efficacy.
The project Is clearly an obvious choice for this form of test: there Is a concentralion In lime, and a
clear situation (precise objectives, timing, evalualion sequences, a clearly defined team) that makes
easier any judgment and decisions concerning the "potenlial". The elite Is then selected according to
their ability to meet the primary requirement of a "good" project director: managerial rlgour and ethics.
They will also understand the meanings of urgency and deadlines: take the fastest, shortest route,
without worrying too much about the perfeclion of the modalilies and especially the human costs
Involved. To that extent, project management may also be conceived es a managerial selecllon
Instrument, simultaneously enabling the control of outputs and behaviours as It seeks to drive
selection of the "best employees" (Fincham 1992; Ray 1986), "reflecllng the sUbjeclive face of
selecllon" (Fincham 1992: 752). The sUbjecliva face demonstrates how thosa In posllions of power to
choose people do so In ways that legitimise their seleclion by showing that they "know what they
Michel had then to abandon sclenliflc ways of working and adopt centralised tools of govemance.
Michel quickly discovered that decision-making power became held In the hands of an ever-present
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..,ean by Ihe vague terms - natural leadership, soundness, judgment character - that th
'" 'ey employ"
(flnc/1sm 1992: 755). Essentially, the best employees will be people for whom project management
l1a5becomeboth a science of control and an instrument of subordination.
hsyioural controle81'
:¢alculative control
'tontrol, whatever form It may take and the procedures Involved, is closely linked to another
management process: assessment through calculation. Making managerial action Increasingly
procedurally based, project management seeks to Increase the knowledge that governing bodies may
have of decentrallsed action linked to Innovation. There Is a double Issue behind this concern for
knowledge: that of assessing as carefully as possible all actions, critical events, decisions and the
reasons behind the decisions, creating the contemporary figure of an "accountable manager"
(McSweeney 1994); that of making the learning process easier through experience. This second logic
Is related to the learning process linked to experience resulting from past actions; even though
obviously, to continue Duran's (1999) line of thought, this version of the learning process can be
likened to the "disenchanted search for the causes" of a failure. Perhaps because this is less related to
the "search for success" of project management than "avoiding unnecessary risks". In such views,
Foucauldian arguments displace power from people to practices such as administrative accounting
systems and calculative Instruments that monitor performance (Armstrong 1989; Miller and O'Leary
1987) and embed these practices In the normalcy that is constructed for organizational systems of
belief. Versions of "corporate culturlsm", In Willmott's terms (1993), legitimise the constraints imposed
by managerial control (Fincham 1992). Sometimes, as Clegg et al (forthcoming) suggest, these create
new codes and ethos of govern mentality.
rJl0dalltles of Project Management Control
fl18 slorlesof project management represent it as a heterogeneous control system coverln
lities hi ' g several
•••od8 ,W ch generate distinct project tensions. We shall now distil these from th t I
". d ab e s or es
COllecle ave. Typologies of such control are familiar In organization theory: one thinks of Ed d'
9) for inslance _ b t th war s
(191 ' u e distinction here Is that we are dealing not with typologie f hmenl s 0 ow
f!'8n8ge Control manUfacturing employees but of how responsible, autonomous project managers
8re controlledremotely (see also, Friedman, 1977). The first, which seems obvious In the history of
jeCIS,15 behaVioural.pro
fhe projectIs an extremely powerful disciplinary system: It permits the creation of aimost permanent
re81.llfeanddecentrallsed tests of skillin a decentrallsed supervisory milieu authorised by the spatlo-
telflPoralconcentration of each project and Its daily Interdependencies. It also occurs via the critical
leslSof communltarian project work that Inevitably occur within teams each day: the decentralisation
trOllsthere~
of cOn are a means to build a management system based on the affirmative and positive
8tlionOJlIYof teams. Of course, such strategies produce tension as well as affirmation through the
prBSStlrethe team puts on each of Its members. The tension generated In the critical periods of
praleelSIsaPOWerfuland legitimate means for observing how Individuals behave when confronted by
difliColllesthat affect both the whole team and Individual members alike. Collaboration Is therefore
testBd8Dy,Whichrapidly creates Individual reputations.
one tensionthat follows from these conditions Is vested In superordinate/subordinate relations.
aeeaoseof the frequent turnover of projects and the consequent depth of diverse project experfences
th81JIle{11bersaccumulate, they have considerable Informal learning at their disposal, expressed In
sh8rP8nd sometimes acerbic dally expressions of the worth of the current project, Its management
;JIICl re18110ns.From such experience comes tension for the managers of projects that do not live up to
tilee~t81lons of experienced team members. Resistance to project management Is readily bullion
Ih~b8sls,asknOwledgeable members require better organizational control from their project leaders.




The aim of such control Is therefore to "gain enough known-how to reduce the Impact of a potential
surprise" (Landau and Stout, 1979). At the same time, It does not mean that the powerful
rationalisation project management permits can offer Insight Into the "real": It also represents
occasions for "fantastic" managerial simplification, which can mask the lack of familiarity and proximity
of the managers with the members of the project team. Such simplification Is clearly Illustrated In those
aspects of project management almost entirely based on the search for and assessment of efficiency.
It produces a judgement that Is supposedly rationally argued; this judgement depends on both the
search for knowledge, precise information, as well as a possible transformation of the mechanisms
and working methods of project teams. The best example of this Is the often-sudden change In
authority of the project leader. This can be explained by the systematic search for facts and figures.
The hierarchical control of projects basically seeks to check that the objectives fixed at the outset have
been respected. If the project manager has successfully Integrated this notion of checking, slhe knows
their task Is to alert the governing bodies as early as possible to warn them that the objectives will not
be reached. This can allow for an adjustment In the objectives before the assessments. If they do not
do this they cannot argue that the objectives were unrealistic or poorly thought up. The power of the
project leader to so argue resides In clear knowledge of rules and procedures, an ability to anticipate
discrepancies and to fix meetings with the governing bodies. Respect of rules and procedures gives
project leaders a certain power In the innovation process. Seen from this angle, traditional project
management Is a long way from liberal models of entrepreneurial governance. Instead, It promotes a




If the Intention of corporate bodies Is ·only" to look at the results of project management then those
working on the projects also understand the controlling procedures to be a way to know via which
mechanism such and such results have been obtained. The problem with project management Is that
today It can seem a technocratic Instrument, disconnected from the project manager's operational
control procedures. Innovation policies suffer because of the Increasing distance between a "pure"
logic of control based on systematic and situational "audits" of performance (Power 1990) found in
project management and the logic of Improving actions that a "less pure" negotiated or even
concertive control (Barker 1993) would allow. Steering In the name of efficiency produces increased
extemal control of Innovative action. Thus control becomes a managed rather than a learning process:
Innovation Is surrendered to routines and creativity may suffer.
The professional constitution of the group of project managers and Its modality Is expressed In
tensions surrounding collegial professional relations. Project managers watch not only their projects
and staff (who In turn watch the project managers and the projects, as we have suggested, through
their own modality). They also exercise surveillance over each other and observe one another. A kind
of reticular professional supervision is created. Each project Is new, so gradually the project managers
shape the rules under the tutelage of those project members whose Instantiation brings the rules Into
concrete existence. Progressively, project leaders rapidly normalise practice-based expertise models.
Organizational control
The tension generated here Is that while such action creates new resources of legitimation for the rest
of the organization it also creates a professional project for project management. Host organizations
sometimes consider such developments negatively because of the way they create links between the
construction of a group of competitors and the knowledge-management strategies of key
organizational positions. The tension resides In the Imposition of a model of organizational proprietary
knowledge In terms of ownership and control, rather than the construction of a parallel model of
competence, based on professional project experience.
Project management Is a system for controlling costs and achieving objectives. It represents a form of
supervision, run by clear procedureswhose viability Is based on the use the project members make of
them. Control procedures are pervasively and powerfully embedded Into the regular and efficient
reporting of actions and decisions made. Reporting Is essential to the project mission and Is
considered by the governing bodies an Indication of the successful operation of the project. The
professional managerial figures who create such reports are clearly distant from those situated In the
entrepreneurial model depicted by some "revolutionaries" (Peters 1987, for a critique of which see du
Gay 2000). Project managers are Intermediaries between a rule-governed organizational body and
local rationales. They have to completely understand organizational constraints and purposes to be
able to transform Imagination Into exemplification. To do so Is not a question of technical expertise or
creative abilities alone - It Is a matter of being more bureaucratic than the bureaucrats, of going
beyond the rules, of being able politically to translate these to all the different project actors.
Bureaucracy Is created as an ertlflclal distance between persons and organizations, partly thanks to
Intermediate experts such as project managers (Kallinikos 2001).
Both project leaders and employing organizations are ambivalent towards this endogenous
professional control. The control Is a constraint, one that proves projects are not spheres of
professional autonomy (at least on a management level). From the organizational perspective the
managerial model that project management entails supposes a high degree of extra-technIcal and
extra-scientific activities. These can sometimes delay the project as a Whole.Professional control can
also represent a supervisory resource, as It can supply project leaders with arguments at specific
limes to push, constrain, eject, or request members to comply In some way, with the support of the
organization that Is the corporate host.
Tensions, between representation and that which Is represented are embedded In this requirement,
however. The panoptical requirements of project reporting requires making visible through figures that
which has transpired, which frequently leads to representation strategies that gloss local action and
activity to those at a contextual distance. Not to put too fine a point on It, they can sometimes lead to
"Cooking the Books" (Clegg, 1975). The onus to report at regular, routine and fixed Intervals can be
too demanding for some project management performance In the short term. Better to gloss
favourably, with the ambition of the project recovering lost ground, due to the very bureaucratic
professionalism of the project managers Involved, as evoked above.
The control of projects Is therefore highly ambivalent, representing both a resource and a constraint.
Where project leaders accept such control it tends to be because It helps them, thanks to Its formal
nature, In transmitting decisions, demands and obligations. Moreover, It Is clear that the technological
forms of project control generate a demand for efficiency. Project management Is a control system,
one that Includes procedures that allow those Involved to account for their acts, judge, and assess
them. The control is considered as an assessment of actions and decisions taken during the project
process and also as a form of awareness of these actions and decisions. The project manager
therefore has to report regUlarlyto his superiors to justify objectives and awareness.
Corporate control
Obviously, behind these registers can be found the assessments made by corporate bodies, which




feedback they have to decide whether to continue with the
instance, when they receive negat ve
tinue investing. Project management Involves political decisions
project, which means they have to con
I
to protect governing bodies from such weak beliefs. It also
In the Innovation process, function ng
oncemlng Individuals. The strength of the control system In
allows the rationalisation of choices c
. Iiminate arbitrary decisions at the periphery so as to overawe
project management Is the ability to e
rvlsln9 a given project involves being responsible for Information
arbitrary decisions at the centre. supe
j ct managers.content and accuracy on the part of pro e
This Is a soft despotism, "degrading people without worrying them" (de Tocquevllle 1961, 1996: 432),
based on a recognition of Intermediation between the political centralization of authority and the
sovereignty of "free SUbjects" wlth respect to their singular destinies. It Is the decentralization of a
certain amount of discretion (to be accountable and responsible for one's actions/decisions) and the
preeminence of a central power, distributed to multiple "servants" salected by those In power, thanks
to specific administrative procedures designed to produce creative compliance (systems linking
potential reward to risk within project management).
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The political hybridization permitted by project management Is basad on a "weak democracy" where It
Is the administration of rules that gives managerial discretion to project managers and their
counterparts. But this discretion does not diminish the central power of governing bodies; on the
contrary, It strengthens It, because people accepting responsibility for projects are chosen In line with
the rationale of the governing bodies, to act creatively within systems designed by them: they are
instruments of legitimacy as much as of domination.
Id political Regimes: Foreshadowing the Future?Hybrid Control and Hybr
The Tocquevlllian distinction between administrative and politlca/ despotism/democracy may be useful
for understanding political regimes In post-bureaucratlclprojectified organizations. In project
management governing bodies give day-to-day administrative discretion to project managers. In so
doing they found an endogenous political regime, compared to the bureaucratic side of project
management, one that enhances operational project autonomy, job discretion and
administrative/behavioural control. Govemlng bodies create adequate and legitimate control rules,
such as selection criteria, monitoring ratios, and behavioural norms, founding an exogenous political
regime. The hybrid Is despotic In nature. It Is fed by fear and clear and credible threats: the threat of
being taken off the project too early for a project manager, for Instance (see table 1) or by the feeling
of powerlessness shared by so many individuals. It is sustained also by the political concentration of
power in the hands of a minority - the classical definition of despotism, according to Montesquieu
(1973: 31-32). But Its hybridity resides In Its sophistication and lack of capricious decision.
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The hybrid Is founded on the refurbishment of bureaucratic procedures rather than their renunciation,
on the clever distribution and spread of control. The project profession we have analysed Is trapped In
the compliance duty It owes to governing bodies, because the latter have selected and eiaborated the
very conditions and criteria for the existence and legitimacy of the profession, Such hybrid despotism
Is also supported by the complicity of project leaders renouncing any will to govern collective bodies
by pragmatically devoting their abilities to try and "govern" their destiny. In the post-bureaucratic
organization, allegedly saturated by diffuse democratic feelings according to which everyone should
be "businessed" (Peters, 1994), a powerfUl hybrid despotism Is developing pervasively, based on the
tricks of equality: for de Tocquevllle, the rhetoric of "equality of chances" furnishes a precious
resource, because It favours Isolation:
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I see a huge crowd of Individuals, all alike and equal, turning round on themselves 10
find the small and vulgar pleasures needed to sallsfy their souls. Each Individual, C1Jtoff
from the others, Is unaware of the fate awaillng them ... as for his fellow dllzens, he Is
next to them, but cannot .ee them. Above thl. mass Is an Immense and tutelary power,
re.ponslble for their pleasures and fates. Ills total, predae, regular, ca~ng and genlle •.
. thus, day after day, It reduces the need for, and the use of, a free-will ... In Uma. of
equality, each Individual Is naturally C1Jtoff from tha othars: he has no heredllary friends
he can tum to for help, no dass to belong to; he Is Isolated and lrampled on with
Impunity (Tocquevllle 1961, 1996: 432-442).
new project dependencies. We conclude that if the future of work and organization Is one of projects,
the contours will remain all too familiarly modern; even as they eliminate central notions, such as
bureaucratic careers In favour of contingent work, and Innovate new forms of governmentallty, projects
remain essentially arenas for remote control rather than the rehearsal of a post-bureaucratic future
perfect.
Tocquevlllean democracy Is founded on constraints - the Idea of a collectively shared commitment to
simultaneously respect individual freedom and personal responsibility (Mill 1956; March and Olsen
1996: 2-3) - which may be strengthened by the political centralization of power: "equality produces
Indeed, two trends: the one leads directly people to an Independence and may push them suddenly to
anarchy, the other leads them through a larger, more secret but more sure way, to servitude"
(Tocquevllle 1996: 396). Contrary to contemporary discourses on organizational democracy,
Tocqueville suggests that In a democratic society, stability and permanence comes from the
centralized authority Imposing rules on people. Because people are permanently transforming,
evolving, moving, changing, the durability of govemlng authoritative bodies Is the guarantor of a
relatively stable political regime. The Individualization of management, enhancing and rewarding
mobility, flexibility, the abolishment of frontiers and the banishment of bureaucracy (Osborne and
Plastrik 1997), is thus similar to the power of governing bodies - the political hybridization that
projectifled organizations may Induce.
Conclusion
The project Is a managerial Institution comprised of a number of controls and procedures.
SimUltaneously, It centralizes Innovative ideas and shifts a culture of Individual knowledge ownership
to organizational ownership. In a way, Innovation becomes a matter for the organization rather than
the Individual scientist or engineer. Empirical findings concerning actually existing project
management, teamwork, the delegation of responsibilities, and of course bureaucratization,
demonstrate that project management does not entail the abolishment of hierarchical organization but
allows the recomposltlon of certain aspects and the confirmation of others. Moreover, It nellher
abolishes control nor those tensions associated with It. Instead, It has dislinct modalities of control,
each of which generates quite specific tensions. These are not so much an Innovation In organization
form but a repositioning of some classic questions, first conceived by Tocquevllle In his ruminations on
democracy and organization form.
It will not be
If the future will be a projectifled society, as Lundin and Sllderholm (1998) suggest, then
f a traditional
one noticeably different from the pasts wllh which we are familiar, other than In the loss 0
them around
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